Forthcoming Book Chapter: “Japan’s 2026 Election and East Asia Security: Implications for Japan’s Defense Policy”

Beyond the headline result—the LDP’s historic single-party super-majority—four additional characteristics of the 2026 campaign and its outcome carry important implications for Japan’s post-election defense policy. First, the LDP won its decisive victory without relying on close electoral cooperation with Kōmeitō, its erstwhile partner in every national election and LDP-led coalition government since 1999. Kōmeitō abandoned the 26-year-old partnership in October 2025, ending a political marriage of convenience that for decades helped the LDP win elections but which also acted as a major constraint on its conservative leaders’ national security reform agenda (Liff and Maeda, 2019). Second, within days of Kōmeitō leaving the coalition, Takaichi replaced it with the conservative, Osaka-based Nippon Ishin no Kai (Ishin)—a party that basically shares the LDP’s goal of major changes to Japan’s defense policy. Third, the abysmal electoral performance of the LDP’s de facto principal HR opposition—the Kōmeitō-Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP)’s hastily assembled Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) —severely weakened the center-left’s ability to check the LDP. The CRA’s loss of 123 (72-percent) of its pre-election seats is particularly relevant for the present study because the CRA was the only major party whose candidates did not overwhelmingly support efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities (Asahi, February 8, 2026).

Read Article →

Asian Survey: “Japan in 2021: COVID-19 (Again), the Olympics, and a New Administration”

For Japan in 2021, COVID-19-related disruption was again the dominant storyline. Its impact transcended societal consequences to affect Japan’s economy, politics, and foreign affairs. It frustrated Japan’s economic recovery and, for the second time in as many years, contributed to a prime minister’s premature resignation. Yet the year also witnessed major positive developments, including…

Read Article →

Asian Survey: “Japan in 2020: COVID-19 and the End of the Abe Era”

JAPAN’S LEADERS BEGAN 2020 full of hope and expectation, and with lofty ambitions. As then-Prime Minister Abe Shinzō (2020a) proclaimed at his New Year’s press conference, “Together with the Japanese people, I will make this historic year . . . a year for carving out a new era for Japan.” Indeed, 2020 was not just any year. Perhaps more than any other in recent memory, the Japanese public (and Abe himself) had long anticipated that 2020 would be one for the history books. In 2013, Japan had been awarded the 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympics. The following January, Abe predicted in a major policy speech that in 2020 Japan would “be newly reborn,” just as, he argued, it had been in 1964, the last time Tokyo hosted a Summer Olympics, just 19 years after Japan’s defeat in World War II (Asahi Shimbun 2014). In 2017, not only was it announced that 2020 would also be the first full year of Japan’s new Reiwa imperial era, but also Abe began repeatedly pledging that he would make it the year that Japan finally revised its (never-amended) US-drafted 1947 constitution—a deeply held ambition central to Abe’s personal and political legacy and a key pillar of the 1955 founding charter of his conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

But COVID-19 had other plans for Japan in 2020.

Read Article →

Brookings Institution Press: “Japan and the Liberal International Order: A Survey Experiment”

Taken collectively, the results suggest that Japanese citizens believe the liberal international order has been crucial to postwar national prosperity and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. There is also robust support for Japan adopting a relatively more proactive posture in international trade and security affairs-within limits. In the economic domain, survey respondents strongly support the idea that Japan has benefited greatly from international free trade and should play a leadership role in that domain regardless of what the United States does. This comports with Solis’s argument that Japan is no longer a follower on free trade, as reflected in its effort to champion the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, also known as TPP-11) after the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the twelve-member Trans-Pacific Partnership in January 2017. With regard to security affairs, the survey reveals strong support for strengthening ties with the United States, for Japan deepening ties with other countries in the region as a counterweight to China, and for pursuing more robust defense capabilities to bolster deterrence, such as increased defense spending. These goals all appear congruent with U.S. policies.

Read Article →