“Though the defense reforms the Abe government has achieved thus far are undoubtedly significant, this study also suggests at least two major implications for thinking about a post-Abe era. First, because many major reforms achieved under Abe build on longer-term trends and have attracted support from within and outside the conservative wing of Abe’s “right-of-center” LDP – including more liberal LDP members, Komeito (the LDP’s “pacifistic” junior coalition partner), and moderates from the (now defunct) “left-of-center” Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) – much of the contemporary discourse appears to exaggerate both the particular significance of Abe as an individual, and his ideology as a driving force in his approach to national security. This, in turn, suggests that evolutionary defense reforms in response to Japan’s changing security environment are likely to continue, even after Abe is no longer in office. Second, several long-standing domestic constraints on Japan’s defense policy, which have frustrated generations of conservative LDP leaders (Abe included) coveting a more radical transformation of Japan’s defense posture, appear likely to persist. Especially salient examples are Japan’s dire fiscal climate (exacerbated by an aging and shrinking population), which severely limits defense spending increases, and continued domestic political resistance to formal revision of the existing clauses of Japan’s never-amended 1947 Constitution’s “pacifist” Article 9.
My latest peer-reviewed article … an analysis of the puzzling durability of Japan’s LDP-Komeito ruling coalition, its theoretical significance, and its practical implications for Japanese politics and foreign policy … is now available […]