Since historic U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK joint statements in spring 2021 emphasizing ‘the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,’, a possible conflict there has simultaneously surfaced in mainstream policy discourse in both Japan and the ROK—arguably for the first time. A series of public statements culminated two years later in the historic Camp David U.S.-Japan-Korea summit statement, which not only ‘reaffirm[ed] the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community’ but also called ‘for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues’. Remarkably, this occurred alongside an unprecedented ‘commitment… to consult trilaterally with each other, in an expeditious manner, to coordinate our responses to regional challenges, provocations, and threats that affect our collective interests and security’ (White House, Citation2023).

Beyond the headlines and high-profile public rhetoric suggesting symbolic solidarity regarding Taiwan and cross-Strait issues, however, several important questions have received far less analytical attention in both scholarship and public discourse than their real-world significance demands. Most important is the question of how the perspectives, policies, and priorities concerning Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait of the U.S.’ two most important ‘front-line’ allies differ. Though neither ally endorses Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and recent high-profile rhetoric calling for ‘cross-Strait peace and stability’ and ‘peaceful resolution’ suggests increasing strategic alignment generally, outstanding differences also deserve attention. Tokyo and Seoul continue to have unique priorities and perspectives when it comes to security and risks regarding Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.